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Abstract 
This paper explores three different scenarios of how the regulatory governance of the network 
industries in Europe is likely to evolve, namely the emergence of European regulators, differentiated 
and therefore more fragmented regulation and self-regulation. This evolution it is argued, is made 
necessary by the fact that the current model regulatory governance of the network industries is not 
stable, both because the institutions and the technology are still (co-)evolving and because the currently 
prevailing model of independent, sector-specific national regulatory authorities is being challenged by 
the dynamics of the network industries, the involved firms, and most importantly by the challenges 
raised by deregulation be it in economic (competition is still not he norm), in political (problems with the 
provision of the services of general interest), and especially in technical terms (problems of 
interoperability, interconnection, capacity management, and system management). In its conclusion the 
paper confronts these three possible scenarios with the current literature on multi-level governance and 
concludes that future modes of regulatory governance in Europe can be identified as challenges of 
multi-level governance.  
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The purpose of this paper is to identify the key characteristics of the emerging modes of governing the 
European network industries. With Giandomenico Majone (1990, 1996), we make the case that a 
European model of network industry regulation has developed since the liberalization of the 
telecommunications industry; yet we go further than Majone by taking explicitly into account the 
technical systems underlying both the liberalization and the regulation of the network industries. At 
present, regulatory practice in Europe covers both the functions of regulation (i.e., the different aspects 
that are being regulated – e.g., competition, market creation, technical aspects and, political aspects) 
and the institutions of regulation (generally a more or less independent regulatory agency).  
However, these practices – and their underlying model – appear to be increasingly at odds with the 
technical and systemic evolution of the network industries. Thus, we argue that the future European 
model of network industry regulation will have to be the result of the co-evolution between the 
technical systems on the one hand and their institutional governance on the other. As a matter of fact, 
“bringing technical system back in”, as we have argued elsewhere, will pose substantial challenges to 
the current practices and underlying model of network industry regulation in Europe (Finger and 
Varone 2006). Therefore, we suggest that at least three diverging policy options (or scenarios) are 
thinkable in the near future: the top-down creation of sector-specific regulators at the European level, 
the bottom-up emergence of differentiated regulations (either at a regional level or across customers’ 
categories) or the devolution of new regulatory powers to major market players (e.g., self-regulation 
by transnational multi-utilities). Furthermore, these three alternative scenarios can be assessed against 
the ideal-typical systems of governance which have been recently proposed by several scholars of 
multi-level governance (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2003, Skelcher 2005).  
The paper is structured as follows: in a first chapter we highlight the key features of the present 
European regulatory model, as it is currently practiced across the network industries. Secondly, we 
identify the co-evolution between institutional governance and technical systems. In a third chapter, 
we formulate three scenarios for the future European regulation of network industries, namely 
European regulators, differentiated regulations, and self-regulation by significant market operators. 
Applying the theoretical approaches of multi-level governance, we finally suggest that these 
alternative regulatory frameworks correspond to different ways of organizing the “(multi-level) 
governance” of the network industries in liberalized markets. Such a multi-level governance 
perspective brings suggests new research questions pertaining to the coherence, the effectiveness, and 
the accountability of regulatory institutional designs, which – in the near future - should also concern 
technical issues and systemic innovations of network infrastructures. 
1. EUROPEAN REGULATION OF THE NETWORK INDUSTRIES 
The underlying assumption of this paper is that there is indeed a European model of network industry 
liberalization and re-regulation. This assumption can be questioned, considering in particular the fact 
that the European Commission does not have much power to impose a mandatory institutional model, 
and that EU Member States still have substantial leeway when it comes to organizing their 
infrastructures as well as the delivery of services of general (economic) interest. Nevertheless, the 
original model of liberalization and re-regulation in the network industries is without doubt the 
telecommunications industry: this is by the way the first and so far only industry where the European 
Commission has successfully liberalized, i.e., introduced markets, reduced regulatory intervention 
after initially regulating market opening, and ultimately generated benefits for the consumers. While 
this original model has inspired the de- and at times the re-regulation of the other network industries 
(e.g. electricity, postal services, railways, etc.), these other industries have proven to be much more 
complicated and, as a result, the model has become significantly complexified since.  
1.1 The European Union as a “Regulatory State” 
On a more theoretical level, Giandomenico Majone (1996) had already argued that there was a model 
of a “regulatory Europe” emerging. National regulation, according to him, must still be considered to 
be relevant and indeed sovereign, but new forms of regulation that operate independently of the 
individual Member States are indeed appearing. Also, Majone declared the European Union to be a 
new “Regulatory State”. In the same vein, other scholars also stress the rise and diffusion of a new 
order of “regulatory capitalism” (Levi-Faur, 2004). 
Traditional forms of regulation included public ownership, regulatory functions assumed by 
government departments under political control, and self-regulatory arrangements. However, the 
liberalization (and sometimes privatization) of the network industries in Europe today creates the need 
to find new institutional venues for regulating competition, market imperfections, private operators, 
and to protect consumers. The central feature of such institutional reform in Europe at both national 
and supranational levels is indeed the delegation of regulatory to independent bodies. Consequently, 
so-called Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs)1 are emerging as the most important and most 
characteristic mode of regulating the network industries in Europe, i.e., the key feature of the 
European model (Thatcher 2002, Gilardi 2005a). In other words, statutory regulation by independent 
bodies is gradually replacing other and older forms of State intervention. The regulatory State is 
considered to be less bureaucratic, more efficient, and more independent of political influences. It is 
also supposed to be less prone to political bargaining, more geared at pragmatic problem-solving, and 
better able to protect the consumers’ interests, rather than defend the interests of the operators.  
In short, Majone has a convincing argument for the development of a (European) “Regulatory State”, 
an expression that became his label. His message was that market development does not lead to 
deregulation but rather to re-regulation. According to him, the regulatory State is neither social nor 
interventionist. It pertains to the correction of market failures and tries to increase the welfare of 
consumers. It institutionalizes a branch of government which guards against possible “regulatory 
failures" through its insulation from majoritarian and political influence. The non-majoritarian 
institutions managing European regulatory politics and the majoritarian institutions of the Member 
states complement each other. Distributive policies are in his view dependent upon majoritarian 
legitimization and must remain the domain of the Member States (Joerges and Roedl, 2004).  
1.2 Characteristics of the European regulatory model 
Historically, network industries were vertically “integrated”. This was particularly the case of 
telecommunications, postal services, public transport, electricity, gas, water distribution, and the 
                                                     
1  Some authors also use the term National Regulatory Authority (NRA), given that the independence of the 
IRAs is the most contested feature of the model. 
 2
audiovisual sector. Also the air transport sector functioned de facto in such an integrated manner. 
Furthermore, the network industries were generally nationally organized. If they were not totally 
integrated within the same enterprise, the professional nature of these industries ensured that all 
concerned actors collaborated, nationally, as well as internationally. Economically, these industries 
operated under what is called a “Cost+ regime”, thus paying primarily attention to the technical 
aspects and only secondarily to financial and/or customer considerations. Finally, these industries 
generally had more or less important public service obligations. Corresponding public service 
objectives were however not ensured by means of regulation, but by means of public ownership. The 
reasons for this was threefold, namely (1) the technical and systemic nature of the infrastructures, (2) 
market failure, and (3) public service objectives. However, this vertical integration is being put into 
question by the process of liberalization since the 1980s, of which the European Commission is a very 
significant actor. 
In Europe, and on the basis of neo-classical economic theory, such liberalization takes the form of 
simultaneous unbundling – a primarily technical endeavor – and competition, whereby unbundling is a 
pre-requisite for competition. As a consequence, the formerly integrated industries are becoming 
fragmented and the different actors within the industry, which were previously co-operating, are now 
increasingly competing or otherwise behaving strategically. The liberalization of the network 
industries is thus simultaneously an attack on both the administrative and the professional logic, and 
moreover affects the technical and systemic nature of the network industries. 
However, it appears that the liberalization of the network industries cannot entirely be assimilated to 
the liberalization of other industries and sectors, given in particular their specific technological nature. 
More precisely, in most network industries only some segments can be liberalized, while others 
remain monopolistic for both technical and economic reasons (e.g., railway infrastructure, air traffic 
control infrastructure, etc.). By definition “imperfect”, this liberalization of the network industries 
leads inevitably to the need to ensure a certain number of functions (see below), which were 
previously assumed by the vertically integrated firm and/or by the industry or sector itself, but which 
are now being “lost” because of liberalization. Consequently, new actors external to the sector must 
now, in the age of unbundling and competition, ensure the fair attribution of the scarce resources, as 
well as the regulation of a market which, as seen, is by definition imperfect. Finally, one must also 
mention the fact that, in the age of liberalization, public service objectives are no longer automatically 
guaranteed, and must therefore be defined and enforced by some external entity. All this leads to the 
fact that, after liberalization (and ideally in parallel to it), the network industries must be re-regulated 
in order to ensure their proper functioning for the benefit of both the citizens and the customers. The 
above considerations constitute the technical argument, which underpins Majone’s observation of re-
regulation. 
Though the European Commission did have very logical and coherent arguments for the liberalization 
of the network industries, it became quickly clear that re-regulation was not only needed, but was 
furthermore going to be a pragmatic, messy, complicated, and incremental process. Not only did 
liberalization lead to re-regulation, but furthermore, re-regulation led to more re-regulation. Overall, 
one can detect in the EU’s re-regulation four different types of arguments, which justify four different 
types of regulatory intervention.  
• Economic arguments are being used for re-regulation, but astonishingly not so much to regulate 
existing competition, but rather to create competition. As a matter of fact, liberalization often does 
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not seem to proceed as planned and therefore further regulatory intervention is required so as to 
(further) create the market. The privileged means to create competition here is so-called Third 
Party Access (TPA), i.e., the granting of rights to use the infrastructure of the incumbent. This idea 
of TPA was initially developed in the telecommunications sector und subsequently spread to all 
network industries. Today, TPA is for example even used in the case when there are no physical 
networks (e.g., postal distribution). Access problems are now found everywhere and access 
regulation becomes so-to-speak the “miracle” solution for market creation.  
• Political arguments become necessary because competition leads to the fact that non-lucrative 
services (which previously had been cross-subsidized within a public enterprise) have to be 
identified and financed specifically. As a matter of fact, incumbents and especially new entrants 
have no incentives to provide non-lucrative public services, and public service regulation therefore 
must be developed so as to force an operator to do the job or to pay for other operators to do it.  
• Increasingly also technical arguments for re-regulation can be heard in Europe. Such technical 
arguments pertain to interoperability, interconnection, capacity management and system 
management, all regulatory functions which become problematic once technical systems are 
unbundled and fragmented (see; Finger, Groenewegen & Künneke, 2005). The successful 
regulation of such technical functions will ultimately decide whether the infrastructure will 
function at all and be sustainable in the long run (see below).  
• As a result of competition (and economic growth more generally) network industries grow and the 
usage of the networks increases. This poses challenges to the usage of the scarce resources upon 
which some network industries rely, such as water, airspace, and spectrum, the usage of which 
subsequently needs to be regulated. 
The institutionalization of such re-regulation is again a pragmatic and stepwise process. Indeed, 
regulatory institutions, especially the model favored by the EU (sector-specific IRAs as we have seen 
above) constitute an institutional novelty within the European continental political-administrative 
system. Thus, the new IRAs somewhat overlap with - in several Member States - pre-existing 
competition authorities. This institutional design also corresponds to a compromise between public 
policy objectives (e.g., political questions), markets (e.g., market creation), and technical questions. 
Graph 1 below indicates which functions are, in the European model, being attributed to the newly 
created, more or less independent, regulatory bodies. Of course, there is a – in some cases massive -- 
overlap between the access function which is assigned to IRAs and the “bottlenecks” category which 
is attributed to competition regulation. 
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Graph 1: Re-regulation competences. 
Source: Finger and Varone (2006: 96) 
This new institutional arrangement resulting from the creation of the IRAs triggers the following five 
observations: 
• There is first a tension between specific regulatory authorities and competition authorities. Sector-
specific regulators are in charge of the technical, the political, and at times the resource attribution 
functions, as well as the market creation function. However, when it comes to competition 
regulation, there is generally an inbuilt conflict between the sector regulator and the already 
existing competition regulator, and this even more so because technical and public service 
regulatory functions all do have implications on competition. There is, so far, no unique 
institutional solution for this tension (see for example the diversity of the solutions adopted in the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France or Germany), other than having these two regulatory 
functions and corresponding institutions reporting to two different ministries, thus balancing the 
power and raising conflicts among these two to the level of a political debate. In some countries, 
there are still other organizations involved in sector regulation. Such is for example the case in 
Germany, where the judiciary plays a significant role in ex-post regulation or in Switzerland where 
price surveillance is a function fulfilled by a specific regulatory authority. While the judiciary 
should only play a role once all other regulatory interventions fail, price surveillance should, in our 
opinion, be integrated into sector-specific regulation, as it constitutes simply a sub-element of 
(political) public service regulation. 
• The second issue concerns the ownership of the incumbent operator. Indeed, in many of the 
network industries one or several (partially) publicly-owned operators will remain. This situation 
generally creates a tension between the sector regulator (as well as the competition regulator) on 
the one hand and the administrative authorities historically in charge of steering and supervising the 
historical operator on the other. At first, these two functions generally remain within the same 
Ministry even though they represent two totally different interests (i.e., ownership interests versus 
consumers’interests). However, over time, the political authorities must clarify and separate these 
two interests. EC law generally requires some separation, i.e., attribution to two different 
ministries. Ideally, the interest of protecting the consumers and of making the sector (e.g., the 
electricity sector, the railways sector) function properly should prevail over the interest of 
protecting the incumbent (by means of ownership measures). But even if ownership objectives are 
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reduced to purely financial objectives – comparable to the interests of a shareholder in a listed 
company – a tension will necessarily always remain between the regulators (sector-specific and 
competition) on the one hand and the owner(s) on the other. The only institutional solution to this 
tension is to attach these objectives and functions to different ministries or levels in order to 
balance power relations or to privatise. For example, the shareholding objective should be attached 
to the finance ministry or to the political authorities of other, especially lower, levels (e.g., regional 
or local political authorities). 
• The “independence” of the regulator is also a very sensitive issue. By definition, sector (and even 
more so competition) regulators are independent from the operators they are supposed to regulate. 
The term “independence” is also used for the institutional separation between the regulator and the 
political authorities. EC law only requires some separation when the State is also present on the 
market as an owner of one of the players. Indeed, the general philosophy is that regulators should 
also be at “arms-length” from government (Chen and Thatcher, 2005). However, the only 
intellectually solid argument for this is public ownership, i.e., the fact that one of the operators - 
which is being regulated - remains being owned by the State. In other words, “independence” of the 
regulator is thus yet another institutional means in order to prevent the confusion of the various 
functions the political authorities inevitably assume (i.e., the ownership function, the sector-
specific regulatory function, and the competition regulation function). This issue of independence 
has in particular a bearing on the questions of the nomination of the members of the regulatory 
bodies (who nominates? For which period of time are regulators nominated?), reporting structures 
(to whom does the regulator report, i.e., to the government, the parliament or a special 
commission?), oversight mechanisms (who oversees the regulator, i.e., parliament, the judiciary or 
still another body?), and power (see next point). (Gilardi, 2005b). 
• Indeed, independence is only one of two key elements to be considered, the other one being the 
power of the regulator. As a matter of fact, a regulator can be very independent yet have little 
power. It is therefore important to consider the power attributes of the regulator, such as the legal 
attributes (can the regulator decide on its own or simply recommend? Can the regulator investigate 
on its own or only act upon complaints? Can the regulator intervene ex-ante or ex-post? Does the 
regulator have to consult with other bodies, such as for example the price surveillance authority 
before acting?), the financial resources (what is its budget?), the human resources (what are its 
competencies?), as well as the financial autonomy (by whom is the regulator paid, i.e., the 
government, the consumers, the operators, or a combination thereof?). These attributes, together 
with the institutional independence, ultimately determine the pressure the regulator can exert and 
the results it can achieve. While the European model goes so far as to urge the creation of a sector-
specific IRA, it leaves significant leeway when it comes to the real power of the regulator. Yet, the 
entire model of sector-specific regulators can only function, if these regulators have power. 
• Finally, there is the issue of the level of regulation. Originally, the idea was that regulation occurs 
at the national level and that regulatory bodies should be set up nationally. However, over time one 
can observe a process of gradually moving up this sector-specific regulatory function to the 
European level, thus Majone’s argument for a “regulatory Europe”. This is already the case of air 
safety regulation (e.g., EASA – European Air Safety Authority), as well as of some rail regulation 
functions (e.g., ERA – European Rail Authority), and will certainly extend to other sectors and 
functions in the future.  
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2. BRINGING TECHNICAL SYSTEMS BACK IN 
A preliminary analysis of the European model of regulating the network industries clearly supports 
Majone’s assertion of an emerging “Regulatory Europe”, which is structured around sector-specific 
regulation and regulators. We also notice that such sector-specific regulators combine market 
regulation with other regulatory functions (e.g., technical and political functions), thus creating new 
institutional arrangements not only in the network industries, but beyond. However, an assessment of 
the above evolution and subsequent institutional framework leads us to three critical observations 
• The liberalization of the network industries was done from a non-technical perspective, more 
precisely from a neo-liberal perspective aiming at introducing markets so as to create competition 
and increase efficiency, quality, and more generally customer satisfaction. The overall objective 
was to “dismantle” the monopolist, and this was done monopolist by monopolist, i.e., sector by 
sector. Moreover, “dismantling the monopolist” was done by introducing competition into one of 
the elements (activities) of the monopolist,2 assuming that all the other elements (e.g., 
infrastructure) would remain unchanged, thus neglecting somewhat the systemic nature of the 
network industries. It was also assumed that the technical characteristics of the networks would 
remain unaffected by these changes, which may well prove to be wrong in the medium and 
especially in the short run (Finger, Groenewegen & Künneke, 2005). 
• Quite logically, then, subsequent regulation (i.e., the new European model) – which became more 
and more necessary as liberalization progressed – was conceptualized in a quite static manner: 
further markets were to be created mainly by means of granting ever more Third Party Access 
(TPA), technical problems as they arose were to be solved, traditional public service objectives 
were to be guaranteed, etc. Furthermore, such static or at times even backward-oriented regulation 
was being institutionalized in sector specific IRAs, which, precisely because of their relative 
independence, started to develop a life of their own, namely by seeking to increase their 
discretionary power. 
• At the same time, however, the dynamics thereby introduced into formerly vertically-integrated 
industries has, not astonishingly, triggered some technical and often systemic innovations, which in 
turn led to the evolution of the technical system, the sector, and the industry. The most telling 
example here is certainly mobile telephony, but analogous examples can be found in all the other 
network industries. The question that now arises is whether the institutional arrangements, which 
are being set up and institutionalized along this new European model are not going to be or are 
already at odds with the state of the technical system, and this to the point where the institutional 
arrangements no longer foster the evolution of the technical system, but actually hinder it. 
In other words, the emergence of the European model of regulating the network industries seems to be 
somewhat – and increasingly so – at odds with the technical and systemic evolution of the network 
industries (which however has been triggered by this very de- and re-regulation). Intellectually, this 
situation must be conceptualized as a problem of co-evolution between technology and institutions in 
general, but more precisely between technical systems (infrastructures) on the one hand and the 
institutional arrangements governing these technical systems (in particular regulation) on the other 
(Finger, Groenewegen & Künneke, 2005). The following graphic 2 summarizes this co-evolution. 
                                                     
2   Note that the aim of the reform in the telecommunications and postal sectors, at least, is to fully liberalize. 
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 Graph 2: co-evolution between institutional framework and technical systems. 
Source: Finger and Varone (2006: 100) 
Based on the above observation of an emerging new European model of regulation and against the 
background of this intellectual framework a series of research questions can thus be formulated, 
namely: 
• What are the consequences of de- and re-regulation on the technical systems? To what degree does 
it trigger technical innovations of systemic nature (e.g., systems innovations)? 
• Which are the core technical functions of systemic nature that must be assumed even after 
liberalization and re-regulation? Preliminary research shows that the four core functions are 
interoperability, interconnection, capacity management, and systems management (Finger, 
Groenwewegen & Künneke, 2005). 
• To what degree and how are these core technical functions of systemic nature reflected in the 
institutional arrangements? And what happens if they are not? 
• How does performance of the network industries reflect this dialectics between the technical and 
the institutional system? 
Answering these questions goes far beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, we highlight in the 
next chapter three potential, but alternative, developments of the European regulation of the network 
industries, which will lead to three different ways the network industries are likely to evolve.  
We argue that such regulatory developments are plausible as several crises situations in the 
infrastructures (e.g., electricity blackouts; shortages of supply of energy; accidents of trains or 
airplanes) lead the European Commission to interpret these systems failures as a failure of national 
regulation and try to increase its intervention and decision-making power. Many examples can be 
found here, notably in the electricity and the air transport sectors, where the European Commission 
has used crises to further its power and to develop an updated regulatory framework. Furthermore, the 
EU is also actively supporting (i.e., by means of subsidies) the construction or rehabilitation of trans-
European networks in the areas of energy, transport, and communications. Subsidizing such networks 
automatically leads to a more integrated and systemic approach, which inevitably leads to regulating 
the access to, technical management, and security of such transnational networks.  
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3. SCENARIOS: EUROPEAN REGULATORS, SELF-REGULATION 
BY MARKET OPERATORS, OR DIFFERENTIATED 
REGULATIONS? 
The main challenge to be addressed by the future European model of regulating the network industries 
– if intended to integrate the above technical considerations into the overall regulatory framework – is 
how to design an institutional framework for regulating the liberalized network industries. A particular 
aspect of this challenge pertains to how and to whom the new regulation powers be delegated? For 
Majone (2001), there are in fact two basic modes of delegation, i.e., agency and trust relationships.  
• On the one hand, power relationships can be characterized as principal-agent relationship. Such a 
principal-agent relationship is broadly defined as a social interaction, in which one actor (the agent) 
makes decisions and carries out actions that are intended to fulfil the interests of another actor (the 
principal). Thus, the principal (e.g., the political authorities) delegates some of its authority to the 
agent (e.g., sector-specific IRA). Agency theorists usually discuss two main types of “agency loss”. 
Because of hidden information, principals may select agents who have preferences that are bound 
to conflict with theirs (problem of adverse selection). Because their action may also be hidden 
whilst in office, they may not even be sanctioned for acting detrimentally to the principal’s welfare 
(problem of moral hazard). Thus, the asymmetry of information between the principal and the 
agent allow the latter to engage in opportunistic behaviour (shirking) that is costly and detrimental 
to the principal and, at the same time, difficult to detect. However, a key assumption of the 
principal-agent approach is that specific institutional rules and arrangements can be designed in a 
way that they guide delegation and accountability in response to these agency problems. These 
rules and arrangements include both ex ante contract design, screening and selection, as well as ex 
post monitoring, reporting and institutional checks.  
• On the other hand, the idea of trust relationship is derived from the trusteeship relation in Anglo-
American law. According to Majone (2001), “a trust is a situation where the owner of some 
property, the ‘settlor’, transfers it to a trustee with the stipulation that the trustee should not treat it 
as her own but manage it for the benefit of the ‘beneficiary’, who could be the settler himself. Since 
agency may possess the element of trust and confidence of a fiduciary relation, both agents and 
trustees can be classed together as fiduciaries for many purposes, but the two concepts are distinct. 
(…) A trustee is an agent and something more. The trustee’s fiduciary duty is not simply a personal 
obligation but is attached to a piece of property – the trust assets” (p. 113) As regard to European 
governance, Majone states that “political property rights” – i.e., some elements of national 
sovereignty – are transferred from national governments to the European institutions for the benefit 
of these governments. This is the case for example with the European Central Bank, whose role 
consists of preserving the “property rights” of the member states in the area of monetary policy. In 
the same vein, some provisions of the Treaty give the Commission real property rights in order to 
safeguard the acquis communautaire, to begin with the right of initiative.  
The main difference between the situation of the agent and of the trustee is the level of independence 
with regard to the principal. Contrary to the agency relationship where the agent’s preferences must be 
in line with those of the principal in order to avoid or minimise agency losses, in the case of a trustee 
relationship, these preferences can be to to a certain extent different from those of the principal in 
order to safeguard the credibility of the policy proposals put forward by the trustee. 
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We argue that such a trust relationship could be at work when delegating powers to regulate 
competition, public service obligations and technical systems integrity of the network industries. Thus, 
the question is: who will be designated as trustee of the European Union for managing the technical 
systems? Three scenarios are thinkable, that all go beyond the actual sector-specific IRA at (sub-) 
national level and the competition regulation at European and national levels. 
• European regulators: The first scenario consists of applying the actual regulatory design of the air 
and rail safety sectors (EASA – European Air Safety Authority and ERA – European Rail 
Authority) to the other network industries. Thus, a sector-specific European regulator is 
institutionalized in order to regulate (the access to and the pricing of) the infrastructure, to monitor 
and sustain technical integrity and innovations, and to guarantee its overall security. This solution 
seems to have strong advantages from both a technical and an economic point of view. In such a 
case, trans-European networks are merely understood as natural monopoly within the European 
market. However, such a scenario (which corresponds to the model envisioned by G. Majone) will 
face strong resistance from the Member States, as well as from the actual owners of the 
infrastructures. 
• “Self-regulation” by market operators: The second scenario assumes that the European institutions 
will never gain sufficient knowledge and expertise to regulate complex technical systems. Thus, 
they will delegate the regulation of the network industries to the major market operators, and 
basically intervene only on competition (anti-trust) issues. This scenario will end up with some 
kind of “self-regulation” by the market operators, who act either as trustee of the European 
authorities or on voluntary basis. It is quite obvious that already now the big market operators are 
cartellized and have reached at times oligopolistic positions in several of the network industries 
(e.g., trans-national multi-utilities). Clearly, the question of political control and accountability of 
these trans-European operators -- should self-regulation prove to be ineffective and inefficient – 
will remain a crucial issue. 
• Differentiated regulations: The third scenario does not emerge as a conscious institutional design 
by the European institutions. On the contrary, it results from a gradual bottom-up process. This 
evolution leads de facto to a physical and technical integration of networks (as infrastructures) and, 
to a harmonization of the sector-specific regulations implemented by neighbouring countries with 
similar socio-economic standards and shared values regarding the services of general (economic) 
interest to be provided. In such a case, both market operators and national IRAs work hand in hand, 
even across borders, so as to secure “their own integrated market”. This scenario seems to be very 
attractive as the national attitudes towards the quality of services of general interest, the 
privatization of public enterprises, etc. still vary significantly accross Europe (e.g., Hall and 
Soskice 2001, Tatcher 2004). And the recent enlargement of the EU will certainly reinforce this 
tendency. Thus, every member state will pay for the services and the security he wants. But the 
development of this “service à la carte” also means the death of a really integrated European 
market. Finally, on could imagine that the scenario of “differentiated regulations” will not only 
spread across member states but also across various types of consumers (e.g., industry, households, 
etc.). In this respect, the “cream-skimming strategies” pursued by the market operators could 
increase inequities among social groups, as well as between countries. In short, the risk of this last 
scenario is that the network industries do no longer contribute to social, economic, and territorial 
cohesion, at least not at an European level. 
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We have seen so far that the actual European model of regulating the network industries is not yet 
systematic, let alone coherent. We have in particular highlighted the technical aspects that will have to 
be regulated in order for these network industries to properly function. However, the concrete 
institutional arrangements of such re-regulation are far from obvious. We have outlined three possible 
scenarios of such institutional arrangements, namely European regulators, self-regulation, and 
differentiated regulation. Thus, as a next research step, one could identify which scenario is supported 
by which institutional actors (at both the EU and Member State levels) and which private actors (e.g., 
operators, consumers). One should also asses the viability and efficiency of each of these three 
scenarios in terms of their implications on the different network industries as technological systems 
(e.g., security aspects, technological innovations), as well as on the delivery of services of general 
interest (e.g., quality of services, affordability, accessibility). Last but not least, one could evaluate the 
impacts of the three scenarios on the institutional balance of power between the EU institutions 
themselves (e.g., DGs of the Commission, European Parliament, Council), between various levels of 
governance (e.g., EU, Member States, local authorities), and between the various bodies engaged in a 
specific regulatory framework (e.g., competition authority, sector-specific regulator, ministry) at the 
various levels.  
All these questions focus de facto on the political acceptability as well as on the (presumed) 
effectiveness of the three scenarios. But one should also address these three scenarios from a 
theoretical point of view, thereby answering the following research question: do the European 
regulators, self-regulation, and differentiated regulation “models” fit into the ideal-typical systems of 
(multi-level) governance as proposed in the academic literature? The last chapter of this article 
suggests some preliminary answers to this question. 
4. MODES OF GOVERNING THE NETWORK INDUSTRIES 
The study of governance mechanisms is obviously a growth industry leading to various and, to some 
extent, contradictory meanings of the concept “governance” (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden 
2004). Therefore, we adopt here the definition of governance as proposed by R. Mayntz (1997), 
whereby she argues that governance modes are basically meant to be solutions to functional problems 
such as the management of interdependence between various actors of a sector. This parsimonious 
definition of governance applies very well to the challenges of managing industry networks 
understood as systemic and dynamic technical infrastructures.  
The major aim of governance is thus to stimulate and secure coordination between these actors whose 
values, beliefs, and interests might actually diverge but who, at the same time, mobilize 
complementary resources (e.g., political authorities, IRAs, networks owners and managers, competing 
operators, etc.) and need to co-operate in order to solve collective action problems (e.g., networks’ 
security, capacity, interoperability, interconnections, investments, innovations, etc.). Furthermore, 
these actors are generally involved in a polycentric system with multiple centres of authority and 
levels of power (e.g., EU, national, and local). Decision-making is thus more frequently based on 
bargaining processes rather than on hierarchical and authoritative decisions. 
One of the key questions discussed by scholars of multi-level governance reads as follows: how should 
multi-level governance be structured and concretely organized in order to be effective (output 
legitimacy or optimality of governance) as well as to be accountable and responsive (input legitimacy 
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or democratic anchorage of governance; Sorensen 2005, Papadopoulos 2003)? As suggested by L. 
Hooghe and G. Marks (2003), there is no consensus yet about how to conceive governance modes: 
“Should jurisdictions be designed around particular communities, or should they be designed around 
particular policy problems? Should jurisdictions bundle competencies, or should they be functionally 
specific? Should jurisdictions be limited in number, or should they proliferate? Should jurisdictions be 
designed to last, or should they be fluid?” (Hooghe and Marks, 2003:236).  
In order to answer these questions, Hogghe and Marks (2003) identify two ideal-types of multi-level 
governance. The first type of governance system is multipurpose (covering several policy domains) 
with nonintersecting memberships (or mutually exclusive spatial domains). It has a limited number of 
jurisdictional tiers and it is relatively permanent. The second type is single-purpose (or task-specific) 
with intersecting memberships and many jurisdictional tiers. It is flexible and changing. Actors 
building this second type of jurisdiction have a common need for collective decision-making – e.g., 
regarding the management of the network infrastructures – but they do not represent a community of 
fate (in sharp contrast to the first type of governance). As a matter of fact, the actors involved in this 
second type of governance will choose among competing jurisdictions (exit option; while the voice 
option characterizes the first mode of governance). Federalism is the intellectual foundation for the 
first (traditional) type of governance mode, while the second (emerging) type is mainly derived from 
neoclassical political economists and public choice theorist (see for example the concept of 
“functional, overlapping, competitive jurisdictions” developed by Frey and Eichenberg 1999). Finally, 
it should be mentioned that the second type of governance system is generally embedded in the first 
one.  
On the basis of the Typology of Hogghe and Marks (2003), Skelcher (2005) distinguishes three 
different forms of the second type of governance system, namely: “clubs”, “agency”, and “polity 
forming”. Actors might join a club if such an institutional design is a guarantee for benefits that would 
otherwise not be available. In other words, actors participate in a club in a rational and self-interested 
way. Agencies (as already discussed in details above, see IRAs) are created in order to operate at arm’s 
length from elected policy-makers. Finally, the so called “polity forming” bodies of governance 
represent a kind of democratic self-governance in relation to a particular task. Table 1 presents an 
overview of these analytical distinctions and classifies the three scenarios briefly discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
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Table 1: Ideal-types of governance (of networks regulation). 
Type II Governance 
systems 
Type I 
Club Agency Polity-forming 
Features Established 
through 
constitution 
building 
Self-generated to 
deliver benefits to 
members 
Created by government 
to deliver public policy 
through flexible 
management under arm’s 
length political 
supervision 
Established to engage 
well defined 
constituency of users  
and delivery of 
specific public policy 
Legitimacy Through electoral 
system and civic 
support 
On basis of 
benefits accruing 
to members 
On basis of government 
mandate 
On basis of popular 
participation 
Consent By elected 
representatives 
On basis of self-
interested 
assessment 
By board appointed or 
nominated by 
government 
Through deliberative 
processes between 
board and 
constituency 
Accountability To legislative 
body of elected 
representatives 
and to citizens 
To organizational 
stakeholders in 
terms of cost-
benefit ratio 
To government at higher 
level on basis of policy 
performance 
To constituency on 
basis of democratic 
process and policy 
achievement 
Scenarios for 
infrastructure 
regulation? 
One pan-
European network 
owned by the EU 
(or national 
management of 
national network) 
“Self-regulation” 
by market 
operators acting 
on a voluntary 
basis 
Creation of European 
regulators  
Differentiated 
regulations across EU 
regions and/or 
customers types 
(or even “regulated Self-
regulation” by market 
operators acting on an 
explicit mandate of EU) 
Source: Free adaptation of Hooghe and Marks (2003:236) and Skelcher (2005:98). 
Table 1 suggests that different types of governance (of infrastructures) might exist and, that each of 
them is related to different mechanisms of effectiveness and accountability. At this stage, further 
research is required to answer two crucial questions, namely: 
• What are the concrete advantages and weaknesses of each governance mode (Type I, club, agency 
and polity forming) for regulating the core (technical) functions of a liberalized network industry? 
Which evaluation criteria should be mobilized to assess these diverging institutional designs (e.g., 
technical optimality, cost-benefit ratio, democratic accountability, etc.)? 
• How do these governance modes fit into the broader institutional framework regulating the network 
industries in Europe today? Are they compatible with the present European and national regulatory 
models, which already include several actors at various levels of government (such as sector-
specific IRAs, competition authorities, etc.)? 
We conclude by stressing, once again, the need to consider explicitly (from both a theoretical and a 
political point of view) the technical issues linked to the liberalization of network industries. This 
should lead us to go one analytical step further than the seminal argument of Majone regarding the 
emergence of a European regulatory state. Furthermore, it appears useful to combine classical 
approaches of regulation with the theories of multilevel governance in order to make sense out of the 
actual and upcoming developments of network industries.  
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